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  The peer group composition of schools is undeniably important in the minds of parents as 
well as policy makers at the local, state, and federal level.  Residential location decisions of 
families, various state and federal laws, and court interpretations of school district policies 
frequently have an implicit if not explicit peer group component.  There have nonetheless been 
relatively few direct investigations of the impact of peer groups on student performance and what 
evidence exists has been open to widely varying interpretations.  This paper pursues a unique 
identification strategy based on small perturbations in cohort composition to extract the causal 
impacts of peer group characteristics on achievement. 
  Peer group effects have played a prominent role in a number of policy debates including 
ability tracking, anti-poverty programs in both rural areas and urban ghettos, and school 
desegregation.  In addition, opposition to the growing demand for expanded school choice or the 
provision of education vouchers often focuses on the importance of peers and potential for greater 
economic and social isolation of disadvantaged students. At the same time advocates of choice 
often tout its potential for reducing the impact of neighborhood economic and racial segregation. 
The role of peers also has entered increasingly into theoretical analyses of school choice.  
Starting from the observation that many people express concern about other students, a variety of 
analyses (e.g., Benabou (1993, 1996), Caucutt (forthcoming), de Bartolome (1990), and Epple 
and Romano (1998)) have examined the equilibrium properties of choice and peer group effects 
on student achievement.   
  This attention to peer effects has taken place largely in the absence of compelling 
empirical evidence on the impact of peer group characteristics on a variety of academic, social, 
and labor market outcomes. As Brock and Durlauf (forthcoming), Manski (1993) and Moffitt 
(2001) point out, the empirical analysis of peer influences has been inhibited by both conceptual 
and data problems -- problems that raise serious questions about interpretation of the existing   -- 1 --
studies, even those that use more sophisticated econometric techniques including instrumental 
variables. These critiques, in part precipitated by parallel analyses of neighborhood poverty (e.g. 
Mayer and Jencks (1989), O’Regan and Quigley (1999), Rosenbaum and Popkin (1991)), point to 
a number of potentially severe empirical problems that are at least partially present in the recent 
set of randomized housing experiments aimed at understanding neighborhood effects (e.g., 
Rosenbaum (1995); Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001); Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield (2001)).
1  
This paper makes use of a unique matched panel data set on students and schools to 
identify the impacts of specific peer group characteristics on academic achievement. It directly 
confronts the central specification issues that impinge on our ability to estimate the achievement 
effects of peer group composition. These include the confounding influences of unobserved or 
badly measured student, family, and school factors and of the reciprocal nature of peer group 
interactions.  
 The basic strategy involves the successive elimination of the components of individual 
student achievement growth that are most likely to confuse family and school influences with 
peer group effects.   While controls for observable characteristics are used, the ability to control 
for fixed individual, school, and school-by-grade effects on test score gains permits the clearest 
identification of peer effects.  Ultimately, we identify these effects by considering the impact of 
small differences in peer group characteristics for successive cohorts of students in a given 
school.
2 This panel data approach is robust to most of the commonly cited estimation dangers. 
One problem not addressed by the fixed effects framework is the reciprocal nature of peer 
interactions that likely introduces simultaneous equations bias when contemporaneous peer 
behavior is proxied by current average achievement.  In the fixed effects framework, 
specifications based on lagged peer achievement eliminate the problem of simultaneous equations 
bias and capture the systematic predetermined aspects of peer interactions. However, this 
                                                      
1 For a review and critique of these studies, see Moffitt (2001).   -- 2 --
approach also ignores the impact of current peer behavior not captured by lagged achievement 
and may therefore lead to an underestimate of peer influences. This issue is addressed at length in 
Section III below. 
 
  Our basic estimation of elementary school achievement growth indicates that the 
achievement level of peers has a positive effect on achievement that is roughly constant across 
quartiles of the school achievement distribution. In contrast, the variance in achievement appears 
to have no systematic influence. 
Despite the fixed effects methodology, important limitations remain in terms of both data 
structure and the available measures of peers and outcomes. The role of peers can be complex.  
Influences may come from friends or role models, or peer group composition may alter the nature 
of instruction in the classroom. We do not have information at the classroom level or about 
friends but instead rely on aggregations of students within the same school and grade.  We also 
have limited information on attributes of peers, though we do include measures for the three most 
commonly expressed peer characteristics: achievement, race, and socio-economic status. Finally, 
due to limited outcome measures available for elementary school students, all empirical work 
examines academic achievement.  Many of the policy discussions and parental concerns focus on 
other outcomes including teen pregnancy, drug use, high school attrition, attitudes toward 
minorities, and employment but to name a few. 
I. Conceptual Issues in the Estimation of Peer Group Effects 
  The identification of specific social interaction effects is a daunting task. Not only must 
the analysis address the endogenous choice of neighborhoods and schools, but it must also 
separate peer influences from the effects of other school characteristics and account for the fact 
                                                                                                                                                              
2 This methodology is similar to that used by Hoxby (2000) in the estimation of class size and racial 
composition effects for students in Connecticut.   -- 3 --
that student and peer achievement are determined simultaneously. In this section we outline an 
empirical framework with which to examine peer influences, following closely the work of Brock 
and Durlauf (forthcoming) and Moffitt (2001) with special emphasis on the educational context. 
  Attempts to estimate peer effects on educational achievement directly have been 
relatively limited.  Hanushek (1972, 1992) finds no peer achievement effects, while Henderson, 
Mieszkowski, and Sauvageau (1976), Summers and Wolfe (1977) and Zimmer and Toma (2000) 
report positive influences of higher achieving peers at least for some students. Consideration of 
ability tracking in schools likewise has yielded mixed results, even though policy has presumed 
that tracking is generally bad for achievement (e.g., see Oakes (1992); Argys, Rees, and Brewer 
(1996).  The evidence on achievement effects of racial composition has been much more 
voluminous, although the results are no easier to summarize or interpret (cf. Armor (1995)). 
  In general there has been limited attention given to the mechanisms through which peers 
affect outcomes.  The most common perspective is that peers, like families, are sources of 
motivation, aspirations, and direct interactions in learning.  Moreover, peers may affect the 
classroom process ￿ aiding learning through questions and answers, contributing to the pace of 
instruction, or hindering learning through disruptive behavior ￿ la Lazear (forthcoming). 
  Most analysis has focused on the identification of the ￿reduced form￿ relationship 
between outcomes and specific measures of peer group quality, typically ignoring the precise 
structure of the underlying causal relationship. An outcome measure is regressed on peer group 
characteristics that are usually constructed as school aggregates of family background variables or 
achievement. These measures are readily available and, if they adequately capture the influences 
of families, would seem appropriate for peers.  While we follow in that tradition, it is important to 
note that ambiguities about the correct measurement of family backgrounds exist, and these 
naturally transfer to the measurement of peer influences.
3 
                                                      
3 The empirical analysis of family background has generally relied just on readily available measures of 
socio-economic status of families to proxy for the learning environment in the home without much   -- 4 --
  The attention to the full causal structure in the case of peers reflects the fact that peer 
composition is a product of both parental choices of neighborhood and school and school policy 
makers￿ decisions on attendance rules and classroom placement of students. One important 
theme, that follows the interpretation of Moffitt (2001) and motivates our work here, is that 
existing peer results are very sensitive to the measurement and specification of various influences 
on achievement.  A central aspect of our modeling is the replication of alternative specifications 
within a consistent database so that elements of the previous inconsistency of findings can be 
disentangled. 
The key issue in the identification of peer group effects on achievement is the separation 
of the effects of peers from other confounding influences.  Two potential problems have pervaded 
the peer literature.  First, measures of peer attributes may be good proxies for omitted or 
mismeasured factors that affect individual achievement, leading to biased results that quite 
generally exaggerate the importance of peers.  Second, because of the simultaneous nature of peer 
interactions ￿ a student both affects her peers and is affected by peers ￿ separating the causal 
impacts is extraordinarily difficult, at least in the most general form.  The formal theoretical 
literature has concentrated most attention on the later issue, while we believe the former is much 
more important in the practical estimation of peer effects in schools.  This section begins with a 
general model of educational achievement and then develops these two aspects of estimating peer 
effects.   
A general model of achievement 
 
In its abstract form, we begin with the commonly held view that today￿s achievement is 
influenced not just by current family, school, and peer interactions but also by those of the past 
that establish the base for any current learning.  Following Brock and Durlauf (forthcoming) and 
                                                                                                                                                              
attention to the details of the structure.  This lack of attention to detail partially reflects the fact that little 
consideration is given to policies directed at changing the characteristics of families, so the details of the 
causal structure have been less important.  When considered directly, however, analyses have largely   -- 5 --
Manski (1993), we separate peer influences into endogenous (behavioral) effects and exogenous 
or predetermined (contextual) effects.  The first category refers to the contemporaneous and 
reciprocal influences of peer achievement on schoolmates, reflecting the fact that the achievement 
of peers is governed by similar achievement relationships.  The second category includes 
measures of peers that are unaffected by current behavior, such as socio-economic status or race.  
We follow past convention and represent the endogenous peer variable as  gs i A ) (−  (average peer 
achievement in a grade) and the predetermined peer variables as  gs i P ) (− (where the subscript (-i) 
means that these variables represent the average values computed over all students in the school 
and grade other than student i).
4 Equation (1) describes achievement (A) for student i in grade G 


















G Gs i G Gs i G Gs G iGs iGs
e A P S X
A P S X
+ + + + +
+ + + =












4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 43 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 42 1











) ( ) ( A
γ λ δ β
γ λ δ β
    
 
where X and S are vectors of family background and school variables, respectively.  Because it is 




                                                                                                                                                              
questioned whether such things as family income or parental education are the driving forces (e.g., Mayer 
(1997) on family income or Behrman and Rosenzweig (2001) on mother￿s education). 
4 For expositional purposes, we write this model as having a single endogenous peer measure.  The analysis 
is easily generalized, and the general results are unchanged by adding other contemporaneous achievement 
measures. 
5 Even though we present achievement just in terms of school experiences, leaving out preschool 
experiences is done solely for expositional ease.  Given the estimation strategy, it has no effect on the 
results.     -- 6 --
The importance of measurement in peer effect estimation 
 
  In reality, researchers virtually never possess the entire history of the relevant inputs. 
Consequently specifications based on equation (1) are rarely if ever directly estimated.  The most 
common alternative, lacking historical information, bases estimation solely on measures of the 
current values of X, S,  ) ( i P − , and  ) ( i A − . But, estimation of specifications of this form offers little 
hope of providing consistent estimates of the peer parameters (λ and γ).   The main issue ￿ one 
that is not specific to peer effect estimation ￿ is that current characteristics will generally be 
correlated with unobserved past determinants of achievement, introducing the standard problem 
of omitted variables bias. 
  In peer estimation, ignoring history has a stronger impact.  Because members of peer 
groups tend to have similar experiences over time through systematic neighborhood and school 
choice, many omitted historical factors will be common to the peer group.  Perhaps even more 
relevant, many left out or poorly measured contemporaneous inputs will also tend to be common 
to the group.  Common past and current omitted factors that affect both individual i￿s 
achievement and peer achievement will induce a correlation of contemporaneous peer factors and 
the individual error term (e), making peer effects appear important even when they have no true 
impact, i.e., even when λ and γ are identically zero.
6 
Such problems have been widely discussed within the general achievement literature.  
For example, in discussions of the interpretations of peer influences contained in the 1966 
Coleman Report (Coleman et al. (1966)), the possible interactions of model misspecification and 
peer group measurement entered into early critiques (Hanushek and Kain (1972), Smith (1972)).  
In other words, the nature and measurement of peer group factors implies that common model 
misspecification is particularly damaging to inferences about the importance of peers. 
                                                      
6See Brock and Durlauf (forthcoming), Manski (1993), or Moffitt (2001) for a formal development of the 
general cases of issues raised in this section.    -- 7 --
An approach to the general problem of estimating achievement relationships, which we 
follow below, begins by taking the first difference of equation (1). The value added specification 
reduces the data requirements to the inputs relevant for grade G, since all of the historical 
















iGs A ∆ is the achievement gain (difference between current grade and previous grade test 
scores) for student i in grade G in school s in cohort c.
7  Student achievement growth is related to 
the contemporaneous inputs (which are the flows of these factors over the observed time period), 
and the generic problems of omitted historical variables are circumvented. 
Even with the value added form, consideration of peer influences complicates the 
estimation of achievement models. The problems of poorly measured individual school and 
background factors (either because of omitted or error-prone measures) have the same extra 
impact in the value added models because of the ￿strong proxy￿ nature of peer measures.  One 
important and relevant example is systematic but unmeasured elements of teacher quality. As a 
simple illustration, assume that the error term in equation (2) omits an aspect of teacher quality 
( G κ ) that, while uncorrelated with XG and the measured school aspects of SG, is common to the 
achievement of peers.  Even in the case where current peer achievement is irrelevant (i.e., γ=0), 
the estimation of the effects of  ) ( i A −  will yield an estimator of peer effects, γ￿, with upward bias 
                                                      
7 An alternative estimation approach is to add a measure of prior achievement to the right hand side.  This 
approach does not constrain the parameter on prior achievement to be one but does add other complications 
with estimation (see Hanushek (1979), Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2001)).  The identification of separate 
cohorts at this point facilitates development of the subsequent estimation strategy.   -- 8 --
that systematically makes peers look more important.  The magnitude of the bias is directly 
related to the importance of the omitted factor in determining achievement.
8  
In part to circumvent such problems of mismeasured current inputs commonly affecting 
all peers, a number of studies have simply dropped  ) ( i A −  from the specification and included its 
lagged value in its place.  Unfortunately, by itself this introduces a series of statistical and 
interpretative problems (depending on the precise nature of the underlying behavior).  For 
example, the lagged average achievement score is likely to remain correlated with the error term 
because of the serial correlation in unobserved teacher, school and individual factors.  Thus, the 
simultaneous equations and omitted variables biases in estimating peer effects, while altered in 
form, are not eliminated. Additionally, the substitution of lagged achievement introduces another 
type of bias that we discuss in detail below. 
Our primary strategy for dealing with these general issues begins by extracting fixed 
components of individuals and schools to deal not only with the most significant omitted 
variables problems but also the key elements of neighborhood and school selectivity. Importantly, 
the substitution of lagged values of peer achievement in place of the current value within such a 
fixed effects framework is not subject to the problems of simultaneous equations and omitted 
variables biases, because the fixed effects eliminate the systematic family and school influences 
that are correlated over time. 
From the starting point of equation (2), equation (3) decomposes the error, υ, into a series 
of components that highlights those factors most likely to contaminate the peer estimates. 
 
                                                      
8Consider in this simple example that a common omitted factor,  G κ , enters linearly into the achievement 
of i and of all peers with a coefficient of β.   The bias simplifies to  ) var( / ) var( ) (
2
G i G A − κ β .   
Intuitively, because the common omitted factor appears both in i￿s achievement and that of peers, a positive 
bias on peer achievement is introduced.    
Moffitt (2001) discusses a variety of possible sources of such errors including a discussion of 
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The first three terms capture time invariant individual (ωi), school (ωs), and school-by-grade 
effects on achievement (ωGs); the fourth factor (
c
G τ ) captures cohort by year differences in the 
testing regime; the fifth component (
c
Gs θ ) captures school-by-grade effects that vary from cohort 
to cohort, most notably the quality of teaching; and the final factor (ε) is a random error capturing 
individual shocks that vary over time. 
    Our approach makes use of matched panel data to remove explicitly the first four 
components: fixed individual, school, school-by-grade, and cohort by grade effects. Notice how 
these fixed effects account for the primary systematic but unobserved differences in students and 
schools. The student fixed effects (in the gains formulation of equation 2) account for all student 
and family factors that do not vary over the period of achievement observation and that affect the 
rate of learning ￿ including ability differences, family child rearing practices, general material 
inputs, consistent motivational influences, and parental attitudes towards schools and peers. This 
approach thus directly deals with many of the most difficult issues of potential bias in the peer 
estimates arising from omitted and mismeasured individual and family factors. 
Next consider any fixed differences in schools that are not perfectly correlated with the 
student fixed effects or included covariates (S and X).  While these are typically correlated with 
peer group composition through school and neighborhood choice, they are accounted for by 
school fixed effects. Finally, even systematic within school changes in achievement gains across 
grades can be accounted for through the use of school-by-grade fixed effects. 
  The importance of the multiple cohorts should not be underestimated. For example, 
consider the possibility that achievement for students in some schools tends to decline as the 
students age due to factors other than peer achievement (e.g., adolescence may be more disruptive 
for economically disadvantaged students). If only fixed individual and school effects were   -- 10 --
removed (as is possible with panel data for a single cohort) in the estimation, the resulting 
positive peer effect estimate would suggest that students were responding to peers when in fact 
other factors had introduced a spurious relationship between the achievement gains of all students 
in a school.  On the other hand, if fixed student and school-by-grade effects are removed ￿ as is 
possible with data for multiple cohorts, such systematic changes in specific schools cannot drive 
the results.  
The estimation of peer effects along with the fixed individual and school-by-grade effects 
intuitively relies on perturbations in the pattern of peers across grades and cohorts; i.e., the 
estimates are identified by small within school and grade differences in peer group characteristics 
between cohorts. Such differences emanate from two sources: mobility into or out of the school 
and, less importantly, changes in student circumstances (e.g. income or achievement). The large 
annual mobility of students, averaging greater than 20 percent per year in the Texas public 
schools, accounts for much of the differences across grades and cohorts.
9 
One significant concern of course is the possibility that the observed changes in peers 
simply act as proxies for other changes in family or school inputs.  Whether our estimation 
strategy can generate consistent estimates hinges upon whether the two time-varying components 
of the error terms (θ and ε in equation 3) are orthogonal to the included peer variables.  Three 
possibilities seem most important.  First, the small observed changes in peer circumstances may 
be related to changes in family conditions that could bias the estimates. An increase or decrease 
in peer average income or achievement may result from similar changes in own family income 
that precipitate a school transfer and exert a direct effect on outcomes.  Alternatively, shifts in 
local labor market conditions may cause changes in both own family and peer group average 
income, making it difficult to disentangle the influences of peers and family.  Second, changes in 
                                                      
9Individual cohorts will differ through random factors such as age patterns of children within a given 
school district.  The estimation, however, relies on both changes across grades for a given cohort and 
differences among cohorts.   Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2001) describe and analyze student mobility.    -- 11 --
school characteristics may affect both own achievement and that of peers. For example, the 
funding and availability of compensatory education programs is linked to school average income, 
possibly building in a correlation between peer average income and programmatic effects.  Or 
teacher differences in a specific grade may vary with peer characteristics.  Finally, school 
selection by other families may be driven by attributes of the school, and the effects of such 
attributes may be confused with peer effects.  Consider a school that is becoming dysfunctional, 
say because of an ineffective principal, and finds that all of its upper income families flee over 
time.  In such a case, achievement of the remaining students could fall along with the incomes of 
peers, erroneously suggesting that peer income affects achievement even when there is no such 
relationship. 
The severity of these potential problems depends in part on the ability to control for 
changes in families and schools. In this analysis (described below) we include time varying 
measures of family income, school characteristics, compensatory program status, and overall 
school transfer behavior.  Perhaps more important given the controls for student and school-by-
grade fixed effects, the potential severity also depends upon the speed with which families 
relocate in response to school conditions.  The concern is simply that families adjust to changes in 
school quality (including peer composition) and thereby might induce bias through equilibrium 
selection behavior.  But, because residential moving is a costly process that undoubtedly includes 
some slow adjustment, movement due to parental selectivity of schools is almost certainly much 
slower than the movement of peer characteristics found in exogenous year-to-year variations. The 
assumption that families also react slowly (i.e., not in the current year) to specific variations in 
teacher quality seems natural, implying that there is no reason to believe that the choice behavior 
of parents to current changes in teachers leads to any presumption about correlation of peer 
factors and annual variations in teacher quality.   It seems plausible that differences captured by 
                                                                                                                                                              
The overall mobility rates cited also exclude any school changes related to natural movements from 
elementary to middle schools, even though such moves will generally affect school peers.   -- 12 --
school or school-by-grade quality provide the prime motivation for any family selection of 
schools. Any remaining variations in annual teacher quality, even if large, must be orthogonal to 
the school-by-grade estimates of quality. Particularly because the average family has more than 
one child, mobility reactions to current shocks to teacher quality are likely to be minimal. 
In sum, the choice of neighborhood and school will tend to bias upward the estimated 
effect of peer achievement unless an exogenous source of variation in peer achievement can be 
identified. Our estimation strategy, which relies on small changes over time and grades in peer 
characteristics, will provide consistent estimates of the underlying peer parameters unless 
systematic changes in the contemporaneous innovations to achievement (θ and ε) are correlated 
with the predetermined peer effects.  Given the available measures of year-to-year changes in 
family and school characteristics and the structure of the data allowing for the removal of student 
and school-by-grade fixed effects, such correlations are likely to be of a very low order of 
importance. 
The reflection problem 
 
Before completing this discussion, an additional issue of peer influences must be 
introduced. The most vexing estimation problem, formulated in detail by Manski (1993), is the 
possible simultaneous determination of achievement for all classmates, with high achievement by 
one student directly improving the achievement of classmates and vice versa.  This possibility, 
which has also received the most theoretical attention, is captured in equation (2) by the inclusion 
of  G i A ) (− , the average achievement of peers. If the achievement of each peer is also governed by 
equation (2), we would have  G i A ) (−  directly related to  iGs A  through individual i￿s influence on 
the others in the class.  As Moffitt (2001) shows, this situation can be thought of as a standard 
simultaneous equations problem, where the induced correlation of  G i A ) (−  and iG υ  leads to 
inconsistent estimation of the peer effect parameter.  The reflection problem (in the terminology 
of Manski (1993)) presents a conundrum, because it is extremely difficult to identify the separate   -- 13 --
structural peer parameters (λ and γ) of equation 2 through standard exclusion restrictions.
10   
Without imposing functional form restrictions, one needs to find aggregate peer factors that do 
not have an individual analog in the achievement relationship, something that is difficult given 
the underlying conceptual basis that portrays peers as essentially extended families.  Nor does 
randomization help, because current behavior of the individual and peers will still be important. 
The estimation and interpretation issue in this framework is whether the 
contemporaneous behavior of peers is important or whether any peer relationship is essentially 
captured by the underlying characteristics including prior achievement. Understanding the 
dimensions of this issue requires more detailed consideration of the peer components in equation 
2.  At the outset, it is important to note that the standard terminology in the reflection problem ￿ 
distinguishing between behavioral and contextual factors ￿ can be confusing in the case of peers 
and achievement.  Similar to measures of family background, the predetermined measures of 
peers such as aggregate parental education levels or racial composition of classmates are in part 
proxies for attitudes, behavioral patterns, and learning related activities that systematically enter 
into the behavior and learning of each student. 
Of course the endogenous peer component represented here by current aggregate 
achievement is distinguished from the other factors mainly because of the reciprocal nature of the 
determination of peer achievement. It is ￿behavioral￿ in the sense that each student￿s actions 
directly affect the rest of the class. It is this issue of simultaneity that severely complicates the 
estimation of γ, not the fact that exogenous characteristics are unrelated to peer group behavior. 
Our estimation concentrates on models that employ lagged peer achievement instead of 
the contemporaneous value.  Interpretation of estimation built on lagged peer achievement 
                                                      
10Necessary conditions for identification can be found in Brock and Durlauf (forthcoming).  An alternative 
estimation approach that relies on randomization of peers helps with problems of common omitted factors 
and the estimation of reduced form relationships but still leaves the basic simultaneous equations problem 
(see Moffitt 2001 and the estimation in Sacerdote (2001)).     -- 14 --
depends on the relationship between lagged and current behavior.
11 If lagged achievement 
captures all of the relevant variation in current peer behavior (i.e. there are no year to year shocks 
in current behavior), there is no bias. Of course in the fixed effects framework there would be no 
need to substitute for current peer achievement if this were the case. More realistically, lagged 
peer achievement is likely to be an imperfect proxy for the current value. If the difference 
between current and lagged measures of peer achievement is random (e.g. the probably of a 
family shock in grade G such as divorce is randomly distributed), the estimated effect of peer 
achievement will generally be biased toward zero in a normal proxy variable effect. Even if the 
current innovation to peer behavior is correlated with lagged peer achievement, under most 
conceivable circumstances the estimated effect will still be downward biased. Therefore the 
estimated effect of lagged achievement should provide a lower bound estimate of γ, and we find 
little reason to believe, at least based on past estimation and descriptions of classroom behavior 
and interactions, that the changes in individual behavior in a particular grade are especially 
important when compared to the underlying systematic differences captured by lagged 
achievement. 
 
II. The UTD Texas Schools Project Microdata  
The cornerstone of this research is the analysis of a unique matched panel data set of 
school operations constructed by the UTD Texas Schools Project, a project conceived of and 
directed by John Kain.  The data track the universe of three successive cohorts of Texas public 
elementary students as they progress through school, beginning with students who attended third 
grade in 1992.  For each cohort there are over 200,000 students in over 3,000 public schools. 
                                                      
11 The more customary interpretation of equation 2 as a structural representation of achievement would lead 
to the estimation based on predetermined peer achievement be viewed as a reduced form relationship.  We 
avoid this because we think of  ) ( i A −  as itself a proxy for the current behavioral interactions that are 
important.   -- 15 --
Unlike many data sets that sample only small numbers from each school, these data enable us to 
create quite accurate measures of peer group characteristics.  
 
Sample Characteristics 
We use data for grades three through six for the three successive cohorts. Only Black, 
Hispanic, and White students are included; the relatively few Asians are excluded in order to 
simplify the models. 
  The student data contain a limited number of student, family, and program characteristics 
including race, ethnicity, gender and eligibility for a free or reduced price lunch (the measure of 
economic disadvantage) and compensatory education services, but the panel feature can be 
exploited to account implicitly for time invariant individual effects on achievement gains. 
Importantly, students who switch schools can be followed as long as they remain in a Texas 
public school. 
  Beginning in 1993, the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) was administered 
each spring to eligible students enrolled in grades three through eight. The criteria referenced 
tests evaluate student mastery of grade-specific subject matter. Unique IDs link the student 
records with the test data. This paper presents results for mathematics, although the results are 
qualitatively quite similar for reading achievement.  Consistent with the findings of our previous 
work on Texas, schools appear to exert a much larger impact on math than reading in grades four 
through six (see Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (forthcoming) and Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 
(2001)). Each math test contains approximately 50 questions. Because the number of questions 
and average percent right varies across time and grades, we transform all test results into 
standardized scores with a mean of zero and variance equal to one. The regression results are 
robust to a number of transformations including the raw percentage correct. In order to avoid   -- 16 --
complications associated with classification as limited English proficient (LEP) or disabled, all 
LEP and special education students are dropped from the analysis.
12 
Importantly, the student database can be linked to information on teachers and schools 
through the school IDs. The school data contain detailed information on individual teachers 
including grade and subject taught, class size, years of experience, and student population served. 
While individual student-teacher matches are not possible, students and teachers can be uniquely 
related to a grade on each campus. Each student is assigned the school average class size and the 
distribution of teacher experience for teachers in regular classrooms for the appropriate grade and 
school year. 
 
Family Background and School Variables 
  The fixed effects capture all stable student, family and grade specific school effects on 
achievement growth. Time varying student and family factors (X) include indicator variables 
identifying eligibility for a free or reduced price lunch, school transfer, and participation in the 
Federal Title 1 compensatory education program for low income children. The vector of time 
varying teacher characteristics (S) includes average class size, percent of teachers with zero years 
of experience, and percent of teachers with one year of experience.  (The relevant set of teacher 
variables is based on prior work on a generalized achievement model in Rivkin, Hanushek, and 
Kain (2001)). 
  The final important issue is the construction of the peer group characteristics. Variables 
are calculated from information on schoolmates by grade (own information is excluded from the 
calculations). Proportion Black, proportion Hispanic, and proportion eligible for a free or reduced 
price lunch use current information.  Their construction is straightforward, though proportion 
                                                      
12 Our analysis of special education Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (forthcoming) suggests that a higher 
proportion of special education students in a grade raises the achievement of regular education students.  
This finding is, however, impervious to the mix of mainstreamed and pull out instruction and leads us to   -- 17 --
eligible for a reduced price lunch is likely to be a noisy measure of peer economic 
circumstances.
13 
As previously discussed, the construction of measures of peer achievement is much more 
problematic. We concentrate entirely on predetermined measures of achievement in order to 
capture the effects of pre-existing differences in the level of human capital that may influence 
peers through social interactions.  By measuring peer achievement with peer test scores from two 
grades earlier we avoid building in a mechanical peer correlation.
14 We explicitly consider both 
the mean and standard deviation of peer achievement and always exclude a student￿s own 
achievement from the calculations. 
The inability to assign students to classrooms also means that peer group characteristics 
are computed by grade rather than by classroom.  While such aggregation reduces problems 
introduced by the nonrandom division of students into classes, it also eliminates all within grade 
and year variation in peer group characteristics and the possibility of examining the effects of 
ability tracking. As a consequence, the coefficient on the variance of peer achievement does not 
present a straightforward interpretation, because the schoolwide variance of peer achievement is 
not simply the average variance of achievement in classrooms as is the case with the level of peer 
achievement and percentage eligible for a reduced price lunch. Additional assumptions 
concerning changes over time in the division of students into classes are required in order to draw 
causal inferences from this coefficient. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
believe that it is not peer group composition per se but potentially aspects of classroom management and/or 
fiscal effects from added special education funding. 
13 The division of students into two family income categories misses substantial within category variation. 
In addition, student cooperation is required to be classified and students may become more reluctant as they 
age, though the school-by-grade fixed effects should address this problem. Unfortunately, there is no 
additional information on family income, so that this often-used variable is the sole indicator of economic 
circumstances. 
14 The problem with achievement in the previous grade (G-1) is that the dependent variable is the test score 
gain. A particularly good teacher who substantially increases achievement in grade G-1 might reduce the 
expected gains in grade G, given that the grade G-1 test score provides the baseline with which to measure   -- 18 --
III.  The Effects of Peers 
Baseline level and value added specifications and more complicated fixed effects models 
generate a series of estimated peer group effects. Table 1 reports results from levels and value 
added specifications that do not remove either student or school fixed effects. These preliminary 
specifications are similar to the bulk of existing work and provide a baseline from which to 
compare the fixed effect estimates.  Table 2 reports results from student, school, and school-by-
grade fixed effects specifications that attempt to account for the endogeneity of the choices made 
by families and schools.
15 Using the full fixed effect model, Table 3 reports results from 
specifications that permit peer group effects to vary by a student￿s ranking in the school test score 
distribution. Specifically, separate peer group effects are estimated for each of the four quartiles 
of the school test score distribution (based on scores in third grade). Variable means and standard 
deviations are reported in Appendix Table A1. 
All specifications include a number of variables whose coefficients are not reported in 
addition to average achievement, the variance in achievement and proportion eligible for a 
subsidized lunch.  These include percent black and percent Hispanic along with interaction terms 
between black and percent black and Hispanic and percent Hispanic in order to permit the effects 
to differ by student race and ethnicity, dummy variables for reduced price lunch eligibility, school 
transfer, and Title 1 program eligibility, and cohort by grade by year indicators.  
 
Baseline Models.  
Table 1 presents basic models of the level and growth of achievement.  Odd number 
columns exclude and even number columns include school characteristics. Because the estimates 
                                                                                                                                                              
grade G achievement gains. School specific nonrandom measurement error in the grade G-1 score may also 
be negatively correlated with grade G gains. 
15 We do not report estimates from specifications in which only subsets of the peer characteristics were 
included. These estimates were quite similar to those for specifications that included all peer 
characteristics.    -- 19 --
are quite insensitive to their inclusion, the remaining tables report only specifications that include 
the school variables. All specifications in Table 1 include indicator variables for race and 
ethnicity (which is subsumed in the individual fixed effects in subsequent tables). 
  Not surprisingly, there is a very strong positive relationship between math achievement 
level and the average achievement of peers in the levels specifications (col. 1 and 2). However, 
this relationship disappears or is reversed for the value added specifications that examine growth 
in achievement (col. 3 and 4).  As discussed, coefficients from the levels specifications almost 
certainly confound peer effects with omitted family characteristics.  Though achievement growth 
models substantially reduce the problem of omitted variables, these specifications may also be 
subject to contamination from a number of sources.
16 
  In contrast to the levels specifications, the value added estimates conform to prior 
expectations for the income variable. A higher proportion of schoolmates eligible for reduced 
price lunches significantly reduces achievement gains. Finally, achievement gains are not 
negatively related to the standard deviation of student achievement as might be expected if 
heterogeneity reduces the effectiveness of classroom instruction. The negative relationship 
observed in the levels specifications disappears once value added models are introduced. 
 
Fixed Effect Estimates    
Neither the simple value added nor levels specifications in Table 1 provide defensible 
estimates of peer group effects. Both are contaminated by problems of omitted variables bias that 
no doubt contribute to the unexpected directions of various peer effects. In this section we exploit 
the power of the stacked panel data sets to isolate the independent effects of peers. Coefficients 
                                                      
16 One possible explanation for the negative value added estimates is related to the test score instrument 
used in Texas. The test does a poor job of capturing gains in knowledge at the upper end of the distribution. 
To the extent that lower achieving students are catching up to others in Texas in terms of basic skills and 
the average peer achievement variable is a proxy for initial achievement level, the estimate of the average 
peer achievement effect would be subject to the type of negative bias observed in Table 1.  While our   -- 20 --
from five specifications are reported. The first controls for student fixed effects (in achievement 
growth), the second controls for both student and school fixed effects, the third controls for 
student and school-by-grade fixed effects, the fourth restricts the sample to those in the same 
campus in both years (essentially removing a student specific school fixed effect), and the fifth 
restricts the sample to campus switchers. In our opinion, it is the variation in peer group variables 
that remains after controlling for both student and school-by-grade fixed effects that offers the 
most convincing identification of the true effects of peers on mathematics achievement. 
  Table 2 demonstrates that the overall estimates are quite sensitive to the error 
specification.  Student fixed effects produce quite different estimates than the simple value added 
models in Table 1, and the addition of school fixed effects leads to further changes for most 
variables. 
Consider the pattern of estimates for the (lagged) peer average math score variable. 
Column 1 shows that the removal of student fixed effects leads to a highly significant coefficient 
of 0.17 that is only slightly reduced by the additional controls for school and school-by-grade 
fixed effects. Controlling for school differences by restricting the sample to only nonmovers 
produces a somewhat higher estimate of 0.24 (column 4).
17 The larger effect for nonmovers is 
consistent with peer influences that are stronger for students who have been in the group for a 
longer period. 
The difference between the school-by-grade fixed effect estimates and those for 
nonmovers may also reflect an artifact of the variable construction.
18  Despite the fact that own 
test score is excluded from the calculation of peer average achievement, a potential problem 
remains.  With the fixed effects methodology the removal of the school-by-grade mean uses own 
                                                                                                                                                              
continuing work is investigating the possibilities of nonlinearities, the results below on quintiles of the 
distribution do not suggest any simple explanation of this type. 
17 The separate estimates are restricted to students who remain in the same campus for both 5
th and 6
th 
grade, where the removal of individual fixed effects also removes an individual specific school fixed effect 
that is not contaminated by own prior score.   
18 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility.   -- 21 --
test score as a part of the calculation (own achievement score contributes to schoolmates￿ peer 
average score).
19 Because differences between cohorts far exceed the within cohort differences 
that result from the omission of each student￿s score from her peer group calculation and because 
own score enters with a two year lag, however, we do not believe that this mechanical result 
could be entirely responsible for the differences in estimates.
20 
The range of 0.15 to 0.24 produced by the full sample school-by-grade and nonmover 
specifications provides the best estimate of the actual peer test score effect, though this should 
probably be considered a lower bound.  The lagged test scores, even constructed from 
information for all schoolmates, provide a noisy measure of current peer achievement because 
some students undergo substantial changes as they progress through school.
21 
Though peer average achievement exerts a significant effect on achievement, there is 
little or no evidence in any of the specifications that changes in the heterogeneity of students 
affects the rate of achievement growth.  This finding suggests that ability grouping per se may 
have minimal effects on average achievement. Note, however, that we have information only on 
variance for the grade as a whole and not variance within classes.  If schools alter their ability 
grouping policies in response to cohort differences in achievement variance, the aggregate 
measure of variance will not capture classroom differences across cohorts, and the estimates will 
not be informative.  
Finally, the estimates in Table 2 do not support the view that lower income peers harm 
achievement. Because percent eligible for a free or reduced price lunch is a very noisy measure of 
peer income, this result is not that surprising. Moreover, the fact that the variable confounds 
                                                      
19 This is of course fundamentally different from including the contemporaneous outcome measure in the 
peer group calculation (which would clearly raise the reflection issue). 
20 The nonmover estimates are generated from a specification that does not remove school-by-grade fixed 
effects, though the similarity of the school and school-by-grade fixed effect estimates in columns 2 and 3 
suggests that this is unlikely to introduce a serious problem. 
21 One other possibility that we explore is that students are more heavily influenced by own race/ethnic 
peers, possibly due to segregation of social interactions within schools. However, the estimates  (not 
reported) do not support this hypothesis. Rather the uniformly smaller (though still highly significant)   -- 22 --
actual income differences with differences in school efforts to classify children as disadvantaged 
introduces additional complications, perhaps contributing to the positive coefficient on percent 
low income in all specifications. 
  A potential problem with the fixed effects approach is that the removal of all between 
school variation reduces the ratio of signal to noise by leaving too little actual variation in peer 
group characteristics.  Appendix Table A2 reports the residual variances of the peer group 
variables following the removal of student and school or school-by-grade fixed effects. In the 
case of the achievement variable, slightly less than ten percent of the original variance remains, 
meaning that a one standard deviation change in the residual roughly equals .1 standard 
deviations of the original test score distribution. This is far from the tip or edge of the 
distribution, and the pattern of estimates do not support a simple measurement error explanation.  
A similar reduction in variance occurs for the standard deviation of test score and the percentage 
receiving a subsidized lunch.
22 
  The strong conclusion that comes from this analysis is that the achievement of peers has a 
strong and direct influence on learning.  While the exact causal mechanism remains ambiguous ￿ 
because we cannot rule out the importance of current peer behavior as opposed to simple skill 
differences ￿ the estimates provide clear evidence of peer effects. 
 
Differences by Quartile 
The results in Table 2 reveal significant effects of peer average achievement for all 
students, but peer influences may affect some students more than others depending on their initial 
position in the school achievement distribution. To examine this possibility, we interacted all peer 
                                                                                                                                                              
estimates suggest that the use of only own demographic group schoolmates in the construction of the peer 
characteristics introduces measurement error. 
22 Though variation in percent eligible for a subsidized lunch emanates from both changes in the student 
body and changes in classification as students age, it is student mobility that accounts for the bulk of the 
variance. In fact calculations of variance (not reported) showed that fixing student eligibility at the fourth 
grade response leads to virtually no change in the residual variances.   -- 23 --
group variables with indicators for the student￿s position in each school￿s achievement 
distribution based on test score in third grade.
23 The coefficients in Table 3 are generated from a 
single regression. 
  The results reveal little variation by school achievement quartile with the exception that 
students in the top quartile may be somewhat less responsive to peer achievement.
24 There is no 
support for the belief that students further below the median are differentially affected than others 
closer to the center of the distribution. Finally, preliminary work (not shown) found no evidence 
of nonlinearities from specifications that ignored a student￿s position in the test score distribution 
but included quadratic terms for all peer characteristics.  
IV. Conclusions 
  The difficulties of isolating school and peer group effects have been well documented. 
We have attempted to overcome problems of omitted variables and simultaneous equations biases 
through the use of a fixed effects framework and lagged measures of peer achievement. The 
results strongly support the view that standard specifications are subject to biases, as the 
sequential introduction of student, school, and school-by-grade fixed effects led to substantial 
changes in the magnitude and often the direction of peer effect estimates. We believe that the 
variation in peer group characteristics that remains after controlling for student and school-by-
grade fixed effects in the rate of achievement growth and a number of time varying student, 
family, and school characteristics provides a valid source of identification for the estimation of 
peer group effects. 
  The results themselves provide little evidence that average income or the heterogeneity of 
peers in terms of variation in achievement levels affect growth in mathematics achievement. 
These results should be qualified by the fact that proportion eligible for a reduced price lunch is a 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
23 Third grade test score was used to avoid a direct link with the dependent variable.   -- 24 --
noisy measure of income and by the fact we use grade rather than classroom level data. While it 
is possible that schools may act to counter adverse effects of heterogeneity, the year-to-year 
changes used in the fixed effects models suggest that given the structure of schools, an increase in 
the variance of achievement does not have a significant negative effect on math learning. 
  Perhaps the most important finding is that peer average achievement has a highly 
significant affect on learning across the test score distribution.  A 0.1 standard deviation increase 
in peer average achievement leads to a roughly 0.02 increase in achievement.  Given that a one 
standard deviation change in peer average achievement is 0.35 of a standard deviation of the 
student test score distribution and that the use of lagged test score introduces error into the 
measure of peer achievement, the point estimate suggests that differences in peer characteristics 
have a substantial effect on the distribution of achievement when cumulated over the entire 
school career. 
  One important drawback of the analysis is the exclusion of current peer behavior that is 
uncorrelated with past peer achievement. If innovations to behavior form an important avenue 
through which peers affect outcomes, the inability to capture such behavior might lead to a 
serious underestimation of peer influences. Unfortunately, the identification of current behavioral 
effects presents serious obstacles in concept as well as practice.   
However, the well-documented persistence of a student￿s performance over time suggests that 
systematic differences among students account for much more of the variation in peer group 
quality than student variations from year-to-year. 
  In terms of public policy, the fact that the effects are similar across the test score 
distribution suggests that a reallocation of students will have little impact on the overall state or 
school average.  Rather it will affect only the distribution of achievement across schools; winners 
from having more able peers are balanced by losers with less able peers. The findings also imply 
                                                                                                                                                              
24 An alternative explanation for the lower estimate for students in the top quartile is that ceiling effects in 
the test attenuate the estimates for these students.   -- 25 --
that there will be additional external benefits to improving student performance through special 
programs, tutoring, etc.. While such benefits are likely to be small in comparison to the main 
effect for the student receiving any treatment, it is clear that student outcomes are intertwined in 
important ways.  Finally, much more must be learned about the effects of peers on other social 
and economic outcomes, and classroom level data are needed to learn more about the impact of 
ability grouping. Table 1. Estimated Effects of Peer Group Characteristics on 
Mathematics Achievement Level and Achievement Gains 
(absolute value of Huber-White adjusted t statistics in parentheses) 
 
 










      
average math score in   0.42  0.42  -0.07  -0.07 
grade g-2  (22.73)  (22.91)  (6.12)  (6.18) 
      
standard deviation of  -0.07  -0.06  0.08  0.09 
scores in grade g-2  (1.67)  (1.35)  (3.36)  (3.64) 
      
Proportion eligible for  0.16  0.13  -0.08  -0.10 
reduced price lunch  (4.82)  (3.67)  (4.78)  (5.24) 
      
sample size  526,546  1,028,162 
  
 
Note:  All specifications include percent black and percent Hispanic, interactions of percent black and 
percent Hispanic with own race, dummy variables for reduce price lunch eligibility, school transfer, Title 1 
program eligibility, gender, black, Hispanic and cohort-by-grade by year indicators.   
Table 2. Estimated Effects of Peer Group Characteristics on 
Mathematics Test Score Gains, Controlling for Student, School, or 






       








       
proportion  eligible  for  0.18 0.12 0.10 0.19 0.16 
Reduced  price  lunch  (3.33) (1.74) (1.82) (1.38) (2.73) 
       
average math score in   0.17  0.16  0.15  0.24  0.14 
grade  g-2  (7.42) (6.21) (6.03) (6.26) (5.20) 
       
Standard  deviation  of  0.06 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.05 
scores in grade g-2  (1.26)  (1.08)  (0.53)  (1.72)  (0.88) 
        
sample size  1,028,162  1,028,162  1,028,162  299,730  728,432 
       
 
 
Note: All specification also include individual fixed effects, percent black and percent Hispanic, 
interactions of percent black and percent Hispanic with own race, dummy variables for reduce price lunch 
eligibility, school transfer, Title 1 program eligibility, and cohort-by-grade-by-year indicators, and average 
class size, proportion of teachers with zero years of experience and proportion of teachers with one year of 
experience.  Stayers are students who do not change school between 5
th and 6
th grade, while movers are 
those who do.   
Table 3. Estimated Effects of Peer Group Characteristics on 
Mathematics Test Score Gains by Quartile of Each School￿s Test 
Score Distribution, Controlling for Student and School-by-grade 






   Bottom  Second Third  Top 
    Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile 
        
Proportion eligible for    0.10  0.11  0.09  -0.03 
reduced price lunch    (1.44)  (1.91)  (1.73)  (0.62) 
        
average math score in     0.12  0.12  0.12  0.08 
grade  g-2   (4.85) (5.20) (5.64) (3.48) 
        
standard deviation of    -0.10  -0.05  -0.01  0.01 
scores in grade g-2    (2.82)  (1.50)  (0.45)  (0.42) 
        
Sample size    1,028,162 
 
Note:  The specification also includes individual and school by grade fixed effects, percent black and 
percent Hispanic, interactions of percent black and percent Hispanic with own race, dummy variables for 
reduce price lunch eligibility, school transfer, Title 1 program eligibility, and cohort-by-grade-by-year 
indicators, and average class size, proportion of teachers with zero years of experience and proportion of 
teachers with one year of experience.   
 
   
Table A1.  Variable Means and Standard Deviations 
 
 
   mean    standard  deviation 
Test Score Gain    0.03    0.63 
Peer Characteristics        
proportion eligible for    0.44    0.26 
reduced price lunch         
average math score in     0.04    0.35 
grade g-2         
standard deviation of    0.91    0.13 
scores in grade g-2         
        
















 Table A2. Residual Variance of Peer Characteristics Following 
Removal of Fixed Effects 
 
 
  Fixed Effects Removed 
 
 






      
proportion eligible for  0.07  0.0038  0.0030  0.0029 
reduced price lunch         
      
average math score in   0.12  0.0179  0.0137  0.0114 
grade  g-2      
      
standard deviation of  0.02  0.0035  0.0028  0.0024 
scores in grade g-2         
      
proportion  black  0.04  0.0017 0.0014 0.0014 
proportion  black  0.09  0.0061 0.0049 0.0048 
for  Blacks      
      
proportion  Hispanic  0.09  0.0023 0.0018 0.0018 
proportion  Hispanic  0.10  0.0031 0.0026 0.0026 
for Hispanics         References 
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